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Constructing Co-governance between Government and Civil Society: An Institutional Approach to Collaboration

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Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze how civil society organizations (CSOs) collaborate with both developed and developing governments in Asia through institutional processes. It argues that in developed countries, institutional arrangements have a positive impact on collaboration. Favourable administrative governance can create collaboration between governments and CSOs. This paper reports on 3,944 studies of CSOs from 2004 to 2009 in Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Dhaka. CSOs in Tokyo have better combined collaborative and institutional processes than those in the other three cities. Governance in Seoul is more polarized than in the other cities, and in both Manila and Dhaka, despite there being a high degree of institutionalized relations between CSOs and the government, their collaboration is low. This research also finds that intermediary institutions between governments and CSOs play a role in co-governance.

Keywords Civil society · Co-governance · Institutionalization · Collaboration · Japan · Korea · Philippines · Bangladesh

Introduction

This aim of this paper is to analyze how civil society organizations (CSOs) in developed and developing countries collaborate with governments through institutional processes. The concept of co-governance suggests that such collaboration can improve a government's effectiveness. The vertical structures employed by the state and the horizontal structures embraced by civil society are forging collaborative relationships. Scholars of natural resource management argue that co-management involving public, civic, and private actors is crucial in directing development (Vodden et al. 2005; Carlssona and Berkes 2005; Hayashi 2004). An equal partnership between civil society

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and government is important in making co-governance work. It is important to expand independent civil society to make government effective.

This paper is organized around three central arguments. First, it argues that institutional arrangements have a positive impact on collaboration in developed countries. Favourable administrative governance can create collaboration between governments and CSOs. To operationalize the argument, this paper sees governance from two dimensions: a behavioural dimension that includes collaboration, and an institutional dimension that includes government regulation of CSOs.

Second, this paper argues that hierarchical governance is too rigid to allow for collaboration with social groups. However, it is possible that with minimal supervision, administrative governance can engage in co-governance with civil society groups. To understand the state-society relation, this paper categorizes governance into four modes: hierarchical, administrative, societal, and self-governance.

Third, the *publicness* – that is, the quality of representing and working on behalf of the public[1] – of governments and CSOs creates the space for collaboration. By adopting Jan Kooiman's (2003) theory on governance, we also argue that governments can aid CSOs through administrative governance.

In this introduction, we sketch the three arguments' general features. In the following section, we define and contextualize the key concepts *co-governance* and *governance,* then briefly introduce categories for the modes of governance. We present an alternative model of co-governance by expanding on Kooiman's existing theory of governance, after which we show how institutionalization and collaboration stand in relation to one another. In the given context, *institutionalization* means that a government regulates the CSOs using an institution, for instance a government agency. To prove the central claim of this paper, we describe the state of co-governance in a comparative mode, using empirical data from Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Dhaka. In the conclusion, we recapitulate issues like institutionalization and collaboration in the context of Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.

Defining Co-governance: Governance and Its Modes

The definition of co-governance is related to the concept of governance per se. Governance is multifaceted and tends to encompass interactions with political society, civil society and the market. According to Jan Kooiman (2003:97), "Co-governance means utilizing organized forms of interactions for governing purposes". Civil society is becoming active in the public sphere and is forming alliances with the government. Said differently, governments are using civil society's social networks to deliver on political commitments. This 'consensual governance' increases the level of collaboration between the state, the market and society. Kooiman's definition of co-governance has the practical implication of conceiving of governance as 'utilizing organized forms of interaction'. But this does not mean less government is good government; rather, it means that organized actors are included in the governance process. This paper defines

[1] Although this definition of publicness is influenced by Jörgen Habermas, we do not discuss his theory of communicative action. We use the term to indicate that there are public services which should be performed by the government and/or CSOs.

co-governance as collaboration between the government and CSOs to fulfil societal commitments. This definition makes a connection between institutional arrangements with limited government involvement and collaboration with CSOs.

We have tried to translate this theoretical frame of co-governance empirically, as shown in Table 6. While the neo-liberal model of governance promotes the development agenda by pursuing economic goals, the definition of governance is not purely based on economic factors; it is also linked with normative behaviour. The World Bank defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank 1991:1). This definition supposes that economic development involves the market and civil society. Kooiman also finds governance to extend beyond the domain of government in a strict sense. His definition promotes the role of normative values and makes the government, the market and civil society equally important. He defines governance as a "totality of interaction, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institution as context for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities" (Kooiman 2003:4). In Kooiman's definition, governance is a comprehensive process that involves social, political and market actors. The focus of this study will be limited to political and social actors, governments, and CSOs.

As intimated, government is not the only actor involved in creating effective governance; the market and social organizations are also catalysts. Yet the involvement of different actors in governing processes does not necessarily diminish their separate identities. Rather, they can be involved without compromising their autonomous status. In a society, parallel tracks of governing processes can exist, and the multiple paths can overlap and intersect in the pursuit of a common goal. However, before combining the governing process among political, social, and market actors, we need to understand the mode of governance in modern society.

Kooiman (2003) distinguishes three categories of governance according to their processes. First, self-governance is a social process in which social groups can manage their own interactions by creating rules for their interaction. Self-governance allows for a high level of autonomy. This coincides with Elinor Ostrom's (1990) suggestion that new institutions, credible commitments and mutual monitoring are means for self-governance. Second, co-governance is a joint task that maintains separate systems of collaboration, co-operation and co-management. Third, hierarchical governance is a manifestation of the vertical or top-down mode of governance. It is embedded in interactions that are based on interventions. The bureaucratic model is a classic example of hierarchical governance.

An Alternative Model

Kooiman emphasizes the many and mixed modes of governance, examples being hierarchical governance, co-governance, and self-governance, all in order to achieve societal governance. However, it is unclear how hierarchical governance can be a part of this collaborative process (Kooiman 2003:10, 115–131). In this paper we offer another mode of governance – administrative governance – as a means of working with social groups. This form of governance is more flexible than hierarchical governance because a government can set up new agencies that can collaborate with CSOs through a minimum of regulations.



Source: Authors' own work

Fig. 1 Institutionalized and Collaborative Dimensions

Collaboration is a behaviour whereby the interested actors work together to achieve a certain goal, and the institutional arrangement provides a set of rules to implement the goal. The combination of a collaborative approach and institutional arrangements enables co-governance to achieve societal goals. If the collaborative motive cannot be satisfied through existing institutions, new institutions can be created to achieve the goal. For example, if societal governance and administrative governance have difficulty collaborating within existing institutions, they can create new institutions such as NGOs to achieve their goals. In many developing countries, there is demand for the delivery of services that the government and market cannot provide. This failure inspires both social and state actors to create new institutions such as NGOs to meet the demand. The modes of governance introduced thus far can be mapped according to two dimensions: collaboration, and institutionalized arrangements, as seen in Fig. 1.

Societal governance is an area of administrative governance and self-governance in which the government, the family, and even the market can participate. It enables governments and CSOs to interact (Kooiman 2003). Kooiman, however, in his definition, includes the family only as an important 'building block' of societal governance; he does not see it as on the same level as CSOs. There is a separate area of self-governance for those who are uninterested in or left behind by administrative and societal governance. We can say that self-governing social groups are isolated from administrative governance. In this paper we focus less attention on self-governance, as our main concerns are collaborative and institutional processes.

Methodology

In this paper we employ quantitative methods to investigate our central claims. We analyze the Japanese Interest Group Study (JIGS) conducted by Yutaka Tsujinaka, who has been conducting a global survey on CSOs since 1997 (outline in Table 1, below).[2]

[2] This survey is part of a larger project called the Cross-national Survey on Civil Society, which conducted similar types of surveys in 15 countries: Japan, South Korea, The U.S.A., Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Brazil, Poland, Estonia, Uzbekistan India and Thailand. The generic name of the survey is Japanese Interest Group Study (JIGS). Only the survey data-set of Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh and the Philippines has been used in this study.

We study 3,944 CSOs on the basis of surveys with structured questionnaires conducted between 2004 and 2009 in Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Dhaka. These major Asian cities were selected on the basis of their developed or developing economic backgrounds. Tokyo and Seoul are classified as developed cities and Manila and Dhaka as developing cities. Based on a comprehensive analysis of these surveys, we identify four types of governance involving government and civil society. These four types are quantified in terms of the collaboration and administrative regulations of the governments and CSOs.

Table 1 gives a delimited outline of the JIGS survey. It was conducted in the capital cities and other major cities in the four countries. In Japan, the survey was conducted nationwide, and the sample size is larger than in South Korea, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. For example, the sample size of the Japanese survey is 15,791, which is tenfold larger than that for Bangladesh. To ensure that our comparison is coherent, we have only included the capital cities of these four countries in our analysis presented in this paper. Central governments are located in capital cities such as Tokyo, Seoul, Manila and Dhaka. The primary business offices and headquarters of CSOs are also located in the capital cities. In this paper, we emphasize a factor analysis over correlation because correlation does not imply a specific causal direction.

We focus on a JIGS survey question which asks about an organization's relationship with a government: "Circle the statement that describes the relationship your organization has with the national or local government. Choose all that apply".[3] We use the responses to this question to create the variables shown in Table 2 below. Here we have selected six common statements from the options and categorized the relationship types according to the two dimensions of 'institutionalized relationship' or 'collaborating relationship'.

In Table 2, institutionalization means that a CSO referred to one of the following: 'accredited or approved by the government', 'licensed by the government', or 'administrative guidance'. Collaboration means that a CSO referred to at least one of the following: 'cooperative and supportive policies and budgets of government', 'exchanging opinions', and 'partnerships to implement projects'.

Jan Kooiman's concept of hierarchical governance is indeed structural, but it could also imply a normative connotation such as 'steering and controlling' behaviour on the part of a government. We understand it as an institutional arrangement that can be put into operation through accreditation, licensing, and guidelines. Collaboration can be measured by policy support, the exchange of opinions, and joint project implementation. Many CSOs distance themselves from the government and are not interested in collaboration with it. These fringe groups can become isolated. They can be unregistered, isolated, self-governing, and, most importantly, autonomous. In these ways, we measure the two dimensions of governance.

Institutionalization

Every culture has institutions that are trusted in and inherited by the people (North et al. 2009). The institutions can also be new and operate within the already-existing cultural dimension of a society. In the modern world, interactive governance includes CSOs

[3] As the survey was conducted in local languages in each county, the translations may differ.

Table 1 Outline of the JIGS Survey: Only data on Japan (2nd Survey), South Korea (2nd Survey), Bangladesh, and the Philippines are presented

Country	Year	Data Source/Survey Method[a]	Population	Sample	Valid Response	Return Rate (%)	Region & Valid Return
Japan (2nd Survey)	2006-2007	Telephone directory/Posting	91,101	91,101	15,791	17.3	Nationwide Survey: Tokyo (1,822) & rest (13,969)
South Korea (2nd Survey)	2008-2009	Telephone directory/E-mail, Fax and Direct interview	112,917	29,422	1,008	3.4	Seoul (262) & rest (746)
The Philippines	2004	Organizational directory/Direct interview	44,051	5,172	1,014	18.5	Manila(855) Cebu (159)
Bangladesh	2006-2007	Telephone directory, Books,/Direct interview	29,528	5,915	1,509	25.5	Dhaka (1,005) Rajshahi (504)

Source: Tsujinaka 2011

[a] The researchers can use the different data sources in order to maximize the inclusiveness of CSOs in each country. A telephone directory is the basis of JIGS because they expect that every active CSO would set up a call centre. The JIGS research covers for-profit, non-profit, and citizen sectors comprehensively in Japan and Korea. However, in some of the countries included in the JIGS survey, there is no comprehensive telephone directory. This is the case for the Philippines and Bangladesh. JIGS therefore used government data sources instead or additionally

Table 2 Operationalization of Two Dimensions of Governance

Dimension	Variables used from JIGS
Institutionalization	1. Accredited or approved by the government
	2. Licensed by the government
	3. Administrative guidance
Collaboration	4. Cooperative and supportive policies and budgets of government
	5. Exchanging opinions
	6. Partnerships to implement projects

Source: Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS)

such as these, plus the government and other market actors. Kooiman describes such arrangements as governance by a combination of governing efforts (Kooiman et al. 2008). For this paper we have studied institutions using variables that depict the relationship between public administration and CSOs. As stated, an 'institutionalized relationship' means that a government regulates the CSOs using an institution. The government and CSOs need not share a common objective, and the relationship between them, however legal, may not be equal.

Table 3 provides us with information on the relationship between governments and societal actors, specifically CSOs. It reveals that there are more formal relationships in Dhaka than in the other three cities. In Dhaka, 82 % of CSOs are accredited or approved by the government. Conversely, CSOs in Seoul are the least affiliated with the government. The trend of Dhaka is toward greater institutionalization, and CSOs in Seoul tend to be more isolated from the government.

The institutional relationships are characterized by 'rigid' or 'soft' regulations. Regulatory regimes in which CSOs are accredited, approved, and licensed are rigidly rule-based. Conversely, administrative guidance has the latitude to regulate CSOs more flexibly. The percentages of CSOs that are accredited, approved, or licensed rather than guided are 12, 15, 74 and 57 % in Tokyo, Seoul, Manila and Dhaka, respectively (Table 4). This implies that the governments in Manila and Dhaka tend to regulate CSOs through rigid regulation. By contrast, the governments in Tokyo and Seoul do not generally guide CSOs with rigid regulation. The corresponding percentages are 5,

Table 3 Institutionalized Relationships with CSOs: Dhaka, Tokyo, Seoul and Manila (%)

Relation	Tokyo	Seoul	Manila	Dhaka
1. Accredited or approved by government	61	41	71	82
2. Licensed by government	55	31	51	70
3. Administrative guidance	63	33	13	36
N	1,803	262	798*	751

Source: Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS)

*The N for 'accredited or approved by the government' is 798, but 797 for 'licensed by the government' and 'administrative guidance'.

Table 4 Rigid and Soft Regulations (%)

Relation	Tokyo	Seoul	Manila	Dhaka
Rigid ("accredited or approved" or "licensed" without "administrative guidance")	12	15	74	57
Soft ("administrative guidance" without "accredited or approved" or "licensed")	5	4	3	1
Both ("administrative guidance" with "accredited or approved" and/or "licensed")	58	29	11	35
N	1,803	262	798	751

Source: Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS)

4, 3 and 1 %. Rule-based regulation is typically accompanied by administrative guidance in all four cities.

Institutionalization and Collaboration

Societal governance is collaborative in nature. Group decisions are instinctively collaborative and are better than individual decisions (Farazmand 2012). Here, a collaborative relationship means that a single task is jointly addressed by the government and CSOs. They work toward a single objective, and the relationship is expected to be based on equality. Table 5 quantifies the collaborative relationships between governments and CSOs according to their nature.

A CSO can collaborate with a government in two ways: directly or indirectly. The collaboration variables in Table 5 regarding the exchange of opinions and the cooperative and supportive policies and budgets of government can be understood as indirect collaboration. A partnership to implement projects can be seen as direct collaboration. Tokyo displays more indirect collaboration (23 and 49 %). Direct collaboration is the lowest (10 %) in Dhaka. In general, Manila and Dhaka have less collaboration than Tokyo and Seoul.

We interpret the difference between the four cities from the perspective of simultaneous distribution of collaboration and institutionalization. Kooiman (2000:142) suggests that an interactive relationship, which could be called 'two-way traffic', is essential in the concept of governance. Institutionalization without collaboration is an expression of 'one-way traffic' from those governing to those being governed. A high

Table 5 Nature of Collaboration between Government and CSOs (%)

Collaboration	Tokyo	Seoul	Manila	Dhaka
4. Cooperative and supportive policies and budgets of government	23	34	25	10
5. Exchanging opinions	49	37	22	28
6. Partnerships to implement projects	29	34	18	10
N	1,803	262	798	751

Source: Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS)

ratio of institutionalized and non-collaborative CSOs implies that a government dominates CSOs unilaterally.

We suggest that there are two ways to make the transition from this one-way traffic to two-way traffic. The first way is that CSOs acquire autonomy and form an equal partnership with a government. From this perspective, non-institutionalized CSOs are expected to be collaborative, since institutionalization is regarded as less autonomous.

However, we do not suppose that a relaxation of domination always promotes interaction. Collaboration also increases when a government deliberately tries to build systematic interaction with CSOs. In this case, institutionalization supports collaboration. While institutionalization might curtail the autonomy of CSOs to some extent, it gives them trust in their government and an opportunity to make contact with it.

Table 6 indicates the simultaneous distribution of collaboration and institutionalization.[4] Here there is an apparent contrast between the developing and developed countries. A ratio of institutionalized and non-collaborative CSOs is high in Manila and Dhaka (54 and 65 %), and low in Tokyo and Seoul (29 and 12 %). In Manila and Dhaka, higher levels of institutionalization do not lead to collaboration. The relationship between the government in Tokyo and CSOs is more institutionalized and collaborative (46 %). In Seoul, institutionalization and collaboration are reported by 36 % of CSOs. The numbers of institutionalized and collaborative CSOs are lower than the numbers of institutionalized but non-collaborating ones in these cities. CSOs in Seoul have a score of 37 %; these are non-institutionalized and they do not collaborate with government. This non-allied relation with the government does not, however, lead us to conclude that they are self-governed. Even self-governance requires institutional frameworks. The lack of collaboration on the part of civil society does not necessarily imply autonomy. In certain circumstances, the confrontational nature of civil society with institutions impedes collaboration. Civil society is then isolated from mainstream administrative and collaborative processes.

Conditions for Collaboration

Table 6 implies that institutionalization has a positive effect on collaborative relationships in Tokyo and Seoul and a negative effect in Manila and Dhaka.[5] However, other social and political aspects would also affect these relationships. We analyze a logistic regression model to examine the aspects of sectors, areas of activity, and the ruling party, with CSOs classified into for-profit, non-profit, citizen, and other sectors (based on Walker 1983).[6]

The model predicts the collaborative relationship. The explanatory variables are as follows: accredited or approved, licensed by the government, administrative guidance,

[4] 'Institutionalization' means that at least one of variable 1, 2 or 3 is yes, and 'collaboration' means that at least one of variable 4, 5 or 6 is yes.

[5] While 62 and 76 % of institutionalized CSOs are collaborative in Tokyo and Seoul, only 38 and 30 % of them are collaborative in Manila and Dhaka.

[6] Groups from the for-profit sector include agriculture, economic/business, and labour groups; non-profit sector groups include educational, government-related, welfare and professional organizations; citizen groups include NGOs, philanthropy, recreational or sports-related, religious, and cultural organizations.

Table 6 Combination of Collaboration and Institutionalization (%)

Tokyo***		Institutionalization		
		Yes	No	Total
Collaboration	Yes	46	11	57
	No	29	14	43
	Total	75	25	100
Seoul***		Institutionalization		
		Yes	No	Total
Collaboration	Yes	36	15	51
	No	12	37	49
	Total	48	52	100
Manila***		Institutionalization		
		Yes	No	Total
Collaboration	Yes	34	10	44
	No	54	2	56
	Total	88	12	100
Dhaka***		Institutionalization		
		Yes	No	Total
Collaboration	Yes	28	4	32
	No	65	3	68
	Total	93	7	100

*** $p<0.001$ (Test of independence). Each test of independence in this paper is a likelihood ratio test.

Source: Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS)

sector of CSOs (profit, non-profit, citizen, and other), area of activity, and contacts with the ruling party. Two variables – area of activity, contacts with the ruling party – are measured on a five-point scale.[7] The other variables are binary (0 or 1) and the accuracy rate is 70 %.[8]

Table 7 lists significant variables beyond the 95 % confidence level in a two-tailed test in the model (the full information is presented in the Appendix). According to the model, institutionalization is statistically significant even when controlling for 'sector', 'area of activity', and 'contacts with the ruling party'. Specifically, while the variables denoting whether the CSO is 'accredited or approved' and/or 'licensed or legally regulated' are negative in Manila and Dhaka, the variable for 'administrative guidance' is positive in all cities. We interpret this to mean that an asymmetrical, rule-based relationship prevents collaboration in Manila and Dhaka, even though 'administrative guidance' is beneficial in these cities. In contrast, all institutionalized relationships are positive in Seoul, although the variable of being 'licensed or legally regulated' is not significant. This implies that institutionalized relations tend to develop two-way traffic

[7] The values for 'activity area' are 0 (local), 1 (provisional), 2 (regional), 3 (national) and 4 (global). The values for 'contacts with the ruling parties' are 0 (never), 1 (sometimes), 2 (about half), 3 (most), 4 (always).
[8] The rates are 75.2 % in Dhaka, 68.3 % in Tokyo, 74.4 % in Seoul, and 68.4 % in Manila (all p values of the independence tests are below 0.1 %).

Table 7 Variables Significant for Collaboration ($p<0.05$)

City	Significant Variables (Unstandardized Coefficient)	
Tokyo	Positive	Licensed by the government (0.4), administrative guidance (0.5), profit sector (1.0), non-profit sector (0.6), contacts with the ruling party (0.6)
	Negative	Accredited or approved (−0.2)
Seoul	Positive	Accredited or approved (1.0), administrative guidance (1.2), contacts with the ruling party (0.5)
Manila	Positive	Administrative guidance (1.3), non-profit sector (0.6), citizen sector (0.6), area of activity (0.3), contacts with the ruling party (0.2)
	Negative	Accredited or approved (−0.6), licensed by the government (−0.8),
Dhaka	Positive	Administrative guidance (1.9), area of activity (0.4), contacts with the ruling party (0.4)
	Negative	Accredited or approved (−1.2)

*** $p<0.001$ (Test of independence)

in Seoul. In Tokyo, although the variable 'accredited or approved' is negatively significant, the coefficient is not high (−0.2) and other relations are positive.

Table 7 also shows that the particular sector of CSOs is significant in Tokyo and Manila. In Tokyo, 'profit sector' is positively significant, and 'sub-government'[9] for agriculture and industry in Japan (Muramatsu et al. 2001) may affect collaboration positively. In contrast, non-profit and citizen sectors are positively significant in Manila. NGOs are generally perceived as a 'counterweight' to the state, and some of them are extremely influential. A case in point is that the non-profit sector has worked with leftist movements against the Marcos and Estrada regimes (Quimpo 2008).

A CSO's area of activity turns out to be highly significant in Manila and Dhaka. This result has two implications. First, the CSOs at the local level in these cities face difficulties in constructing collaborative relationships because of the weak local governments. Second, this result also implies that foreign organizations can have an impact. The national and international dimensions of their efforts have made Bangladeshi NGOs more culturally similar to foreign NGOs, or more prone to collaborate with them than with the bureaucracy (Jamil 1998). In our study, having contacts with the ruling party is significant in every city. Connections with the ruling party may therefore help CSOs establish collaborative relationships with the government.

Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to understand how CSOs collaborate with governments through institutional processes. We find that collaborative and institutional processes vary across countries. In the collaborative and institutionalized dimensions of these processes (as stated, we improvise on Kooiman's (2003) three modes of governance), we discern four distinct patterns: administrative, societal, hierarchical, and self-

[9] In Tokyo, 'profit sector' is positively significant, and 'sub-government

governing. The publicness of a CSO provides it with the opportunity to collaborate with the government. This interaction can be constructed through institutionalization. The two dimensions – institutionalization and collaboration – can be operationalized through interaction between civil society and government.

Our study shows that civil society in Tokyo has combined the collaborative and institutional processes to a greater extent than have the other three cities. Governance in Seoul is more polarized than in the other cities. In both Manila and Dhaka, CSOs have a high degree of institutionalized relationships with the government, but the collaboration is still low, to the point where the CSOs can be described as non-collaborative. From this we can infer that the absence of local government and the presence of political clientelism have made collaboration difficult in these cities. By contrast, collaborating CSOs in Tokyo and Seoul are present at both the local and national levels.

We need to move beyond the arithmetic and shed light on the question of why some countries are more successful at co-governance than others. Japan is considered a successful case of co-governance because it has intermediary institutions that bring the government and CSOs together. However, negative aspects can be discerned in some intermediary institutions in the Philippines and Bangladesh; we make due to mention political clientelism, which impedes collaboration.

First of all, institutions do not automatically develop with the creation of wealth. Rather, social processes and political decisions create institutions. Japan and Korea are both developed Asian countries, but the institutionalization of social groups differs between these countries. Korean CSOs are subject to politicization and are co-opted by the government (Kim 2009), whereas Japan has successfully developed local government institutions that have local authority over the tax system. In fact, these local governments act as intermediary institutions between the central government and the local people. Japanese local governments forge partnerships with the aid of social institutions such as the Neighbourhood Association to manage local affairs (Pekkanen 2006). Conversely, local governments in Korea were managed by the provincial governments from 1965 to 1995. In the Philippines and Bangladesh, despite constitutional provisions for autonomous local government, the central governments manage local affairs (Sidel 2004; Siddiqui 2008). In the absence of robust local governance, CSOs cannot participate in co-governance.

Second, if a government seeks to collaborate with social actors to achieve normative goals, it requires networks such as think-tanks, academics, social workers, and professional groups. A government can promote these networks as a means for developing cooperation between itself and the CSOs. This could provide two-way communication between the actors. CSOs can also deploy these networks as negotiators who can lobby the government. Governments and CSOs both can employ such networks in an institutionalized form. Yutaka Tsujinaka finds that Japanese ministries arrange meetings with intermediary groups to navigate and negotiate with social and business groups. Conversely, CSOs also lobby bureaucrats on behalf of policy change (Tsujinaka 2012). There is thus a danger of being trapped in an *amakudari* practice.[10] Nevertheless, collaboration between governments and CSOs is much broader than the narrowly

[10] *Amakudari* is a Japanese word. The literary meaning is 'descent from heaven'. In the social science literature, *amakudari* refers to the costly transaction of institutional practices that allow retired bureaucrats to obtain higher positions in the corporate entities that they regulated during their public service careers.

focused *amakudari*, as various networks work as go-betweens to construct co-governance. These intermediary groups are catalysts of cooperation in Japan that are rarely found in Korea, the Philippines, or Bangladesh.

Third, political clientelism has different implications in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. Bangladesh's civil society is incorporated by the political parties, which employ the social network in a partisan manner. In the Philippines, oligarchs such as the land owner class and political dynasties hamper the ability of CSOs to be autonomous (Sidel 2004:3–5). In Korea, the relationship between the political parties and civil society is confrontational, and neither side makes regular attempts to calm this agitation and arrive at an agreement (Oh 2012). Political clientelism can operate as a bottleneck for cooperation because it encourages partisan actors. In Japan, meanwhile, the relationship between civil society and the political parties is based on decisions that promote 'pork barrel' agreements (Fukui and Fukai 1996). This is a rational arrangement between the principal and agent that promotes a mutually beneficial outcome.

Constructing political institutions may not require a long process, but their maintenance is crucial for improving governance. CSOs can demand these institutions and then become part of the process of their evolution, but CSOs cannot create public institutions. Once the public institutions are created, CSOs can participate in the governance process in the form of co-governance. In developing countries, despite effective intermediary institutions, CSOs continue to expand their publicness in a unilateral manner.

Appendix

Table 8 Logistic Regression Model: Estimating Collaboration

Parameter	B	Std. Error	Hypothesis Test		
			Wald Chi-Square	Sig.	
(Intercept)	−2.06	0.98	4.41	0.036	*
Tokyo	1.18	1.00	1.38	0.239	
Seoul	0.74	1.11	0.44	0.506	
Manila	1.77	1.01	3.11	0.078	
Dhaka (Constant)	0.00				
Accredited or approved (Tokyo)	−0.24	0.14	2.76	0.096	
Accredited or approved (Seoul)	1.01	0.47	4.58	0.032	*
Accredited or approved (Manila)	−0.64	0.17	13.48	0.000	***
Accredited or approved (Dhaka)	−1.23	0.25	24.68	0.000	***
Licensed by the government (Tokyo)	0.41	0.14	8.38	0.004	**
Licensed by the government (Seoul)	0.61	0.61	1.01	0.314	
Licensed by the government (Manila)	−0.80	0.16	25.05	0.000	***
Licensed by the government (Dhaka)	0.08	0.22	0.12	0.732	
Admin guidance (Tokyo)	0.45	0.15	8.77	0.003	**
Admin guidance (Seoul)	1.27	0.58	4.81	0.028	*

Table 8 (continued)

Parameter	B	Std. Error	Hypothesis Test		
			Wald Chi-Square	Sig.	
Admin guidance (Manila)	1.31	0.25	28.06	0.000	***
Admin guidance (Dhaka)	1.87	0.21	77.89	0.000	***
Profit sector (Tokyo)	1.02	0.18	33.66	0.000	***
Profit sector (Seoul)	0.63	0.67	0.89	0.345	
Profit sector (Manila)	0.35	0.40	0.79	0.374	
Profit sector (Dhaka)	0.63	0.96	0.43	0.512	
Non-profit sector (Tokyo)	0.57	0.19	9.59	0.002	**
Non-profit sector (Seoul)	0.75	0.59	1.61	0.205	
Non-profit sector (Manila)	0.56	0.24	5.36	0.021	*
Non-profit sector (Dhaka)	0.91	0.96	0.90	0.343	
Citizen sector (Tokyo)	−0.08	0.19	0.16	0.689	
Citizen sector (Seoul)	0.23	0.51	0.21	0.650	
Citizen sector (Manila)	0.60	0.19	9.90	0.002	**
Citizen sector (Dhaka)	0.49	0.96	0.27	0.605	
Area of activity (Tokyo)	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.956	
Area of activity (Seoul)	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.978	
Area of activity (Manila)	0.31	0.07	20.44	0.000	***
Area of activity (Dhaka)	0.41	0.08	28.83	0.000	***
Contacts with the ruling party (Tokyo)	0.58	0.06	91.96	0.000	***
Contacts with the ruling party (Seoul)	0.48	0.17	8.37	0.004	**
Contacts with the ruling party (Manila)	0.23	0.08	7.30	0.007	**
Contacts with the ruling party (Dhaka)	0.42	0.10	16.48	0.000	***

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

*1 N=3,245 (Dhaka: 705, Tokyo: 1,593, Seoul: 180, and Manila: 767)

*2 Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square: 768.43, df=35, $p<0.001$

Table 9 Accuracy of the Logistic Regression Model (Predicting Collaboration)

***			Predicted value		Total
			Yes	No	
Actual value	Yes	Count	1,109	494	1,603
		%	34.2 %	15.2 %	49.4 %
	No	Count	475	1,167	1,642
		%	14.6 %	36.0 %	50.6 %
	Total	Count	1,584	1,661	3,245
		%	48.8 %	51.2 %	100.0 %

*** $p<0.001$ (Test of independence)

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